Blue2thprinting (blue-[tooth)-printing]: answering the question of 'WTF am I even looking at?!'

Abstract

If one wants to know (for attack or defense) whether a Bluetooth (BT) device is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote over-the-air exploits, one needs to be able to query what firmware or OS the target is running. Unfortunately there is no universally-available method to get this information across all BT devices. There is also no past work that attempts to rigorously obtain this information. Therefore we have created the “Blue2thprint” project to begin to collect “toothprints” (2thprints) of BT devices, and bring the exciting world of forensic odontology to you!

This research discusses what information is readily available by existing inquiry tools and methods. We show how that information is not what we need, as it has been focused more on tracking individual devices, or on exposing device characteristics, models, and manufacturer information. We will show how some readily-available information is useful for giving partial answers about firmware and OS versions, but how this information is completely inconsistent in its availability or meaning. It turns out many 2thprints are missing teeth!

Thus we’ll show why it is necessary to send custom packets and packet sequences in order to build more robust 2thprints. These custom packets and sequences cannot be created by using existing BT software interfaces. They require utilizing custom firmware on the packet-sending device.

This research will present a new state-of-the-art when it comes to exposing the known, the unknown, and the under-known of BT device identification. And it will show what work remains, before we can approach 100% identification for any random device that shows up in a BT scan.

Xeno Kovah

Dark Mentor Level X

Hacking firmware like it’s no big deal.